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Abstract—Relying on ubiquitous Internet connectivity, applica-
tions on mobile devices frequently perform web requests during
their execution. They fetch data for users to interact with, invoke
remote functionalities, or send user-generated content or meta-
data. These requests collectively reveal common practices of mo-
bile application development, like what external services are used
and how, and they point to possible negative effects like security
and privacy violations, or impacts on battery life. In this paper,
we assess different ways to analyze what web requests Android
applications make. We start by presenting dynamic data collected
from running 20 randomly selected Android applications and
observing their network activity. Next, we present a static analysis
tool, Stringoid, that analyzes string concatenations in Android
applications to estimate constructed URL strings. Using Stringoid,
we extract URLs from 30, 000 Android applications, and compare
the performance with a simpler constant extraction analysis.
Finally, we present a discussion of the advantages and limitations
of dynamic and static analyses when extracting URLs, as we
compare the data extracted by Stringoid from the same 20
applications with the dynamically collected data.
Keywords-mobile applications; web requests; static analysis;
dynamic analysis;
I. INTRODUCTION
Many mobile applications use the ubiquitous Internet con-
nection of mobile devices to make web requests, meaning
network requests based on web technologies like HTTP as
a transfer protocol, or JSON or XML as data formats. For
example, using web requests, applications consume third party
services through web APIs to interact with otherwise inacces-
sible resources, like data or functionalities. Reliance on such
services is especially important as mobile devices have limited
storage and processing capabilities. The largest public catalog
of web APIs, ProgrammableWeb [1], documents the rising
number of such APIs, listing currently over 16, 500 APIs, up
from only 100 in 2005 and 5, 000 in 2012. Mobile applications
also perform web requests to obtain data from or transmit
data to proprietary backends, including sending user-generated
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data, data about the usage of applications, or the context in
which they are used.
Knowing what web requests are made by mobile applica-
tions is desirable for multiple reasons. Regarding individual
applications, knowing about web requests is important for
security and privacy reasons. Users care about privacy and
security issues related to mobile devices in particular [2], and
their concerns to this regard have been intensely studied [3].
Web requests do not have to be disclosed to users, who have
little or no insight or even control over what requests are
performed, and thus over what data is sent, when, and to
whom. Apart from privacy concerns, web requests may also
eat into users’ data plans and reduce battery life – in fact,
a recent study finds that mobile applications’ network usage
is the leading factor in the energy consumption of mobile
devices [4]. Across applications, information about web re-
quests performed from mobile applications helps to understand
the usage of web APIs. API directories and recommendation
services such as API Harmony [5] inform developers on which
APIs are commonly used by applications, both individually
and in combinations with each other. From analyzing source
code, they could learn which specific API endpoints are
frequently used, and how (e.g., what query parameters are
used; what data is sent in request bodies).
Information on the requests mobile application make and
when, while valuable, is typically not made available to users
or developers. The resulting question is how can we learn what
web requests mobile applications make?
In this paper, we address this question with three contribu-
tions:
• We present a dataset of dynamically monitored HTTP(S)
traffic from 20 randomly selected Android applications.
Our analysis of that data provides insights into application
behavior and also shows the difficulties to obtain web
request-data dynamically with high coverage.
• We present a publicly available tool called Stringoid
to automatically scan Android applications for string
concatenation operations indicative of the construction of
URLs, and therefore of potential web requests.
• We perform two experiments to statically extract URLs
from Android applications, first using a simple constant
string extraction and second relying on the presented
Stringoid tool. We present results from performing these
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experiments on the 30, 000 most used Android applica-
tions obtained from the Playdrone dataset [6].
Our comparison of the statically and dynamically obtained
data highlights the challenges of our work, motivating a
discussion on the limitations of dynamic and static analyses
in general.
In the remainder of this paper, we start by outlining prelim-
inaries on web requests and establish some metrics which we
use in our experiments in Section II. We present our method
for dynamically collecting request data from 20 Android
applications and an analysis of that data in Section III. Next,
we shift our focus to statically learning about web requests
in Section IV. We describe our publicly available Stringoid
tool to statically extract URL strings from Android application
source code in Section IV-A. We present an analysis of
the data resulting from applying a simple constant string
extraction and Stringoid to 30, 000 Android applications in
Section IV-D. Finally, we compare and discuss the dynamic
and static analysis approaches in Section V, before presenting
related work in Section VI and concluding in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce concepts and terminology used
in the rest of the paper, and give an overview of the problems
involved in determining the web requests Android applications
make.
Our work focuses on a specific class of outgoing network
requests made by applications, namely HTTP requests. While
applications can in principle make requests over other proto-
cols, we believe that HTTP is by far the most common one.
Such requests can be to third-party APIs (e.g. ad networks,
authentication providers), or to services known only to the
application developers (e.g. server backend supporting the
application functionality).
An HTTP request is characterized by several components:
the URL, the method (e.g. GET, POST), the headers, and the
body. A corresponding response from the server has another
set of headers and a body. In this paper, we concentrate on the
URL part of requests, as it contains the information relevant to
answering the question of which services or hosts are accessed.
A. Anatomy of URLs
By design, URLs are constructed as hierarchical sets of
information. Consider for instance the URL:
http://example.com/api/users/SMcDuck?extended=true
In the example above, we call http the protocol,
example.com the domain name, and /api/users/SMcDuck
the path. We call extended a query parameter key (referred
to as key), true a query parameter value (referred to simply
as value), and extended=true a query parameter key-value
pair (referred to simply as key-value pair).
The parts that form a URL are of different nature: Within
an application, some parts are typically static, for example the
host and domain of a request. Other parts are dynamic, for
example the above path parameter used to identify a specific
user or the query parameter value. Dynamic URL parts are
typically provided at runtime by either an application user or
the environment in which an application runs in.
When dynamically observing requests, URLs are always
fully-formed, however, for the purpose of static analysis, it
is useful to define a concept of URL pattern. Patterns make
explicit the parts which can be filled in by the application. In
the following example, the dynamic parts of a set of URLs
are denoted with brackets (placeholders):
http://example.com/api/users/[ ]?extended=[ ]
Note that a pattern may have no placeholders, so all URLs
are also patterns.
The different parts of a URL or URL pattern contain
different information regarding a request. From the fully-
formed example URL above, we can learn that data is trans-
ferred without being encrypted as the HTTP protocol is used
(rather than HTTPS). We also learn from the domain and first
path component that the request targeted the “api” hosted by
“example.com”. Furthermore, a “users” resource was invoked,
which was identified by “SMcDuck” and “extended” data
was requested. When inferring URL patterns from multiple
observed URLs, it might be learned that users are identified
by alphanumeric words of a certain length or that the query
parameter “extended” expects Boolean values. Overall, URL
act as a proxy that allows to infer a considerable amount of
information on web requests.
B. Quantifying URL sets
When running dynamic and static analyses designed to
collect sets of URLs, we are interested in making quantitative
and qualitative assessments of the results. We could count the
number of URLs retrieved for a given application, but there
are two main reasons for which this approach is unsatisfactory.
First, analyses can produce large sets of very similar URLs;
in a dynamic experiment, this can happen if an application
makes repeated requests, changing only a small set of param-
eters. A static analysis tries to enumerate all possible URLs
created by a given code fragment, and if that fragment contains
conditionals, the set can in principle be very large.
Second, as we have seen above, the information represented
in URLs is hierarchical. A set of URLs differing only in
the value of a query parameter, for instance, is qualitatively
different from a set of the same size showing many different
top-level domains.
To address both issues, when applicable, we break down
URLs into components: domains, paths, query parameter keys
and query parameter values. This separation can also be
applied to patterns of URLs. Consider for instance the three
patterns below, two of which contain a placeholder:
http://example.com/api/info?user=bar&limit=12
http://example.com/[ ]?show=[ ]
http://example.com/api/list?sort=[ ]
From this set, we compute the following elements:
• one domain name: example.com
• three paths: /api/info, [ ], and list
• four keys: user, limit, show, and sort
• four values: user=bar, limit=12, show=[ ], sort=[ ]
As a convention we count placeholders as one distinct value.
Finally, so as to not conflate, e.g., identical paths appearing in
URLs for different domains, we organize sets of URLs into:
1) a set of domains (domains)
2) a set of pairs of a domain and a path (path-pairs)
3) a set of triples of a domain, a path, and a query parameter
key (key-triples)
4) a set of quadruples of a domain, a path, a query parameter
key, and a query parameter value (value-tuples)
This methodology properly accounts for URLs that contain a
subset of information of another, or where the query parame-
ters are re-ordered.
III. DYNAMIC ANALYSIS
The first approach to obtain data about the web requests a
mobile application makes is to observe the network traffic that
application makes. This approach, ideally, provides not only
an exact account of what requests are actually made, but also
when and in what frequency while using the application.
A. Data collection method
To obtain dynamic web request data, we ran 20 randomly
selected applications from the Playdrone data set [6] in the
Android emulator and monitored the outgoing and incoming
HTTP traffic.
1) Runtime environment: As a virtual device, we used
a Google Nexus 4 running Android 4.2 (codenamed “Jelly
Bean”, API level 17). To collect the possibly encrypted HTTP
traffic, we proxied the traffic of the Android emulator through
the mitmproxy tool1 by configuring the network settings of
the virtual device. The proxy acts as a man-in-the-middle:
after installing the appropriate SSL certificate on the virtual
device, the proxy listens in on the requests made by the
device, whether they are encrypted or not, forwards them
to their destination, listens to the responses and re-encrypts
them before serving them to the device. We were thus able to
monitor and log the full content of all HTTPS requests and
responses made from the virtual device. To actually collect the
desired data, we wrote an inline script used by the proxy to
log information on every HTTP and HTTPS request, including
the request’s URL, HTTP method, resulting HTTP status code,
and the received data.
2) Application selection: In order to eliminate any bias in
the selection of applications, we picked them randomly from
the set of the 5, 000 most popular applications in the Playdrone
dataset. For a variety of reasons, we could not simply keep the
first random picks:
• 16 applications could not be installed through the Android
Debug Bridge (ADB), reportedly due to container errors
• 32 applications could be installed, but crashed immedi-
ately upon opening
1mitmproxy 0.14; http://mitmproxy.org/
We further dismissed 16 applications that we considered unfit
for the experiment:
• 6 applications had limited or no functionality, for example
just setting a single, fixed, background image
• 4 applications were designed to perform arbitrary user-
defined HTTP requests, such as browsers or network tools
• 2 applications made no HTTP request
• 2 applications were excluded because we could not
properly use them as they were in a language we do not
understand
• 2 applications were written in JavaScript in a Java con-
tainer, and thus unfit for analysis by Stringoid
The above reasons mean that we ended up attempting to
install and test 84 applications to build our test suite of 20
applications.
3) Testing protocol: For each of the 20 applications, we
used the following protocol: we installed the application on
the virtual device and uninstalled all other applications to
avoid them making requests in the background. We then
started and manually used the installed application for 5
minutes. When using the application, we attempted to cover
as many features as possible. If an action in the application
activated another application (typically, opening a browser),
we immediately returned back to the application in focus. If
necessary, we created user accounts to be able to fully use the
application. After 5 minutes, we closed the application and
stopped recording the traffic.
B. Dynamic request data
Overall, using the above data collection method, we ob-
served 5, 975 requests performed by the 20 applications.
Request counts per application of our experiment are shown
in Table V. The dynamically collected request and response
data is publicly available [7].
1) Data summarization: The column “overall” in Table V
shows for each application the number of HTTP requests it
made in the 5 minute window, and the column “unique” shows
the corresponding number of distinct URLs being invoked.
What is immediately striking is that the lowest number of
observed HTTP requests is 81, meaning that every application
assessed made at least on average one request every 3.5
seconds. Half of the applications made more than 215 requests
(around one request every 1.4 seconds) and one quarter of
the applications made more than 324 requests (more than
one request per second). The most active application made
1, 059 requests in the 5 minute interval, meaning it performed
on average 3.53 requests per second. These numbers are
significant even without knowing about the nature of requests
as network activity has been found to be the major impact of
mobile applications on the battery life of mobile devices [4].
Figure 1 shows three selected examples of when requests
occurred over the five minute experiment interval. In “Lep’s
world”, a jump-and-run game, most requests are performed
shortly after starting the application and entering a game,
at which point advertisements are shown to the user. In
contrast, the game “Paper toss” (which performed the most
Fig. 1: Web requests per second for selected applications.
requests in the experiment) occasionally presents users with
advertisements, leading to related bursts of requests. The final
example, “iFunny”, shows comedic pictures such as memes to
users, which are loaded on-demand while interacting with the
application.
Across all 5, 975 requests, 5, 277 (88.3%) used GET, and the
remaining 698 (11.7%) used POST. No other HTTP methods
were observed. Only 2, 986 requests (50%) succeeded, mean-
ing they resulted in a status code between 200 and 399.
Of the remaining 2, 989 requests, only 71 (2.4%) reported
an HTTP status code, while 1, 460 requests (48.8%) aborted
due to a client error, and 1, 446 requests (48.3%) did not
succeed because the server disconnected before the request
could succeed. Client disconnects mean that the client aborted
the TCP connection underlying the HTTP request before the
server managed to respond, for example due to timeouts. One
possible reason for server disconnects is that the requested
service is no longer available, which could be due to the rela-
tively old age of the tested applications. Despite the relatively
high degree of unsuccessful requests, there were no noticeable
interferences with the functionalities of the test applications,
raising questions on the exact nature of the observed requests.
2) Nature of observed requests: In this section, we aim
to assess the nature of the dynamically observed requests.
One way to do so is to assess the content-type of their
responses. Of the 2, 986 requests resulting in a response
with an HTTP status code, 2, 863 define a content-type
header. The remaining 123 responses simply did not contain
such a header. Table I provides an overview of content-type
categories. To create the categories, different content-types
were selected using the regular expressions reported in the
table. The chosen categories allow to classify the content types
in a mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive way. As
the table shows, media files (images, video, and audio) make
out the most common type of responses, namely 43.4%. Next,
source code (HTML, JavaScript, and CSS) accounts for 37.3%
of responses, followed by data (JSON, XML, and plain text)
Content type Used regex # requests # ad requests
Image ∧image 1,198 412 (34.4%)
HTML html 616 266 (43.2%)
JavaScript javascript 372 108 (29.0%)
JSON json 266 35 (13.2%)
Stream octet|stream 83 6 (7.2%)
CSS css 79 27 (34.2%)
Cache cache 65 63 (96.9%)
Xml (application|text)/.*xml 59 6 (10.2%)
Video ∧video 35 3 (8.6%)
Font font|ttf 31 2 (6.5%)
Zip zip 27 1 (3.7%)
Plain text plain 21 3 (14.3%)
Audio ∧audio 10 1 (10.0%)
Thrift thrift 1 0 (0.0%)
Sum 3, 077 933
TABLE I: Categories of content-type of responses re-
ceived overall and from advertisement services. Percentage de-
note the share of advertisement responses among all responses
for each content-type.
with 12.1%.
While response content-types help understand the nature
of a request, they do not help to answer the question why
a request was made. To answer this question, we aimed to
obtain a qualitative overview of what types of requests are
made. We looked at the request URLs and find that overall 293
different domains are targeted by the requests. 3, 029 requests
(a little over 50%), however, target only one of 23 domains.
We manually assessed these domains and find that 8 of them
(accounting for 1, 430 requests, or 23.9% of all requests) target
advertisement services, 6 of them (accounting for 689 requests,
or 11.5% of all requests) target content delivery networks, and
3 of them (accounting for 250 requests, or 4.2% of all requests)
target APIs. All three categories were determined by manual
investigation into the domains in question. The remaining
requests out of the manually assessed sample targeted websites
that do not lend themselves for categorization.
Motivated by the manual assessment, we aim to focus on
request to advertisement services. We make use of publicly
available lists of known advertisement services [8], [9]. These
lists are typically used for ad-blocking software, allowing to
tag requests based on their URL to either target advertisement
services or not. We ran all observed URLs against the latest
versions of these lists as of January 25th 2017 and thus
found that 1, 826 or 30.6% of all request target advertisement
services, of which 933 (51% of ad requests; 30.3% of suc-
cessful requests) succeeded. We assessed the content-types of
succeeding ad requests in column “# ad requests” in Table I.
The presented percentage number in that column indicates how
many of all requests for a certain content type were caused by
ad requests. From the table we can see that requests targeting
advertisement services are over-proportionally responsible for
requests to media files (images, video, and audio) and source
code (HTML, JavaScript, and CSS), accounting for 33.5% and
37.6% of them respectively (thus exceeding their overall share
of requests of 30.6%). On the other hand, they are relatively
under-represented when it comes to requests for data (JSON,
XML, and plain text), accounting for only 12.1% of them.
C. Discussion and takeaways
Dynamic request data, on first sight, seems to be extremely
precise: we observe the actual requests a mobile applications
makes. However, precision can be impacted by requests made
by other applications on a device or background processes.
Trying to associate requests to their origin application is
a recent research problem [10], [11]. In addition, observed
requests do not necessarily represent all requests an applica-
tion would make if its usage was extended, thus impeding
recall. Even though we tried to use applications extensively
in our experiment, we were not necessarily able to cover
all functionalities that may induce requests. This is because
sometimes parts of an applications are only accessible with
membership accounts or to paid members, functionalities may
only be available on certain devices, at certain times, or in
certain regions, or because functionalities may depend on other
apps being installed.
Despite these limitations, the dynamic analysis revealed
large amounts of requests for every one of the tested 20
applications. Assessing these requests revealed that a signifi-
cant amount of them, namely over 30%, target advertisement
services. In future work, it would be interesting to see whether
these results generalize to larger and more diverse sets of
applications (e.g. paid applications).
IV. STATIC ANALYSES
While the dynamic analysis presented in Section III reflects
the actual requests made by an application, it also has some
downsides. Performing the dynamic analysis requires a lot of
effort to install the application and manually execute it, even
if the required virtual device and proxy are already set up. In
addition, as discussed in Section III-C, the manual execution
may not cover the whole application and thus leave potential
requests undetected. To scale the analysis of requests, another
option is to apply static analysis on the application code. In
this section, we present a static analysis tool called Stringoid
built to extract URLs, reflecting web requests, from Android
applications. We furthermore perform a large-scale experiment
with Stringoid on 30, 000 Android applications and compare
its results with basic constant extraction.
A. The Stringoid tool for static analysis
Stringoid is a static analysis tool developed for our inquiry
into web requests made by Android applications. It is designed
to be fully automatic, and with the goal of achieving relatively
low running times (seconds, or a small number of minutes) on
common applications, so that it can be applied to a large set
of applications. Stringoid is publicly available.2
Stringoid takes as input an Android application archive
(.apk file) and produces a set of string patterns representing
URLs. As an illustration of the type of information Stringoid
can extract from programs, consider the method in Figure 2.
The method can build URLs following two patterns:
2https://github.com/amaurremi/stringoid
String getWeatherUrl() {
String host = ”https :// weather.example.com”;
String timeQuery = ”time=”;
if (forToday) timeQuery += ”today”;
else timeQuery += this.time;
String locationQuery = ”city=” + getCity ();
return String.format(
”%s?%s&%s”, host, timeQuery, locationQuery);
}
Fig. 2: Example of code creating URLs in Java.
https://weather.example.com?time=today&city=[ ]
and
https://weather.example.com?time=[ ]&city=[ ]
...where the placeholders possibly indicate the results of
getCity() and this.time. The purpose of Stringoid is to
automatically build such representations of URL patterns from
applications compiled from code such as the above.
The tool operates in four main steps, which we describe
below. Note that we only present superficially the static
analysis techniques in the interest of readability.
1) Reading the program structure: The first step is to
ingest the Android application and to construct an in-memory
representation of its code structure. For this task, Stringoid
uses WALA [12], a toolkit for static analysis of Java and
Android applications. WALA constructs, for each method of
each class (including libraries bundled with the application),
a representation of the control-flow graph. Note that in our
setting, WALA operates on bytecode.
2) Estimating StringBuilder pointer sets: The second
step determines the correspondence between program variables
and instances of StringBuilder. This step is necessary
largely because of the difference between Java source code
and Java bytecode: while the representations are notoriously
close, the most important difference affecting Stringoid is
that string concatenations (a + b in Java) are rewritten by
the compiler into .append operations on StringBuilder
instances. Reasoning about objects is generally difficult in
static analyses because of aliasing (the relationship between
variables and the objects they can point to at each program
point). The second step tracks aliasing to StringBuilder
objects, in effect allowing the next step to reason as if the
Java compiler had not transformed the code.
3) Constructing automata: The third step uses the in-
formation obtained in the previous one, and analyzes each
concatenation operation on StringBuilders, and each use
of String.format in the program. From that information
and from the logical structure of the methods (if-branches and
loop-conditions), it constructs automata representing the sets
of strings possibly constructed in the program. As a simpli-
fying measure and to guarantee performance proportional to
the size of the applications, Stringoid traverses loops at most
once. We found this tradeoff to be acceptable based on the
assumptions that in practice few URLs would be constructed
in loops. A direct consequence of this design decision is that
q0start q1 q2 q3
q4q5q6q7
“https://...” “?” “time=”
“today”this.time
“&”“city=”getCity()
Fig. 3: Automaton representing the set of URLs constructed
in Figure 2.
{ ” url ” : {
”concat” : [
{ ”kind” : ”constant”,
”value” : ”https :// weather.example.com” },
{ ”kind” : ”constant”, ”value” : ”?” },
{ ”kind” : ”constant”, ”value” : ”time=” },
{ ”kind” : ” field ” ,
”type” : ”java.lang.Date”,
”name” : ”time” },
{ ”kind” : ”constant”, ”value” : ”&city=” },
{ ”kind” : ”method−call”,
”return−type” : ”java.lang.String” ,
”name” : ”getCity () ” } } ] },
”methods” : [ ”java.lang.String getWeatherUrl()” ] }
Fig. 4: Serialized automaton representing the URL patterns
from Figure 2.
all automata produced by Stringoid are acyclic. Figure 3 shows
the automaton corresponding to the code shown in Figure 2.
We chose automata for their compact representation of many
possible code paths.
4) Outputing results: The final step filters out automata
that definitely do not represent URLs; for instance, if they
start with a constant string that is clearly not a URL prefix.
Finally, Stringoid outputs a serialized version of all remaining
automata, which can be consumed by post-processing tools
to compute statistics, or e.g. to enumerate URL patterns
represented. In our experiments described below, for instance,
we typically only keep URL patterns that can be processed by
Python urllib library. Figure 4 shows this representation for
the automaton in Figure 3.
B. Limitations
Every static analysis is built around a set of tradeoffs, and
Stringoid is no exception. As already mentioned, Stringoid
will not detect URL patterns that depend on more than
one traversal of a loop in their construction. In addition,
because the analysis is intra-procedural (i.e. does not con-
sider execution across multiple methods), patterns may be
less precise than desired. The pointer set construction phase
may also introduce imprecision in programs that manipulate
StringBuilder instances explicitly (as opposed to those
generated by the Java compiler), if the aliasing relations
are difficult to track (for instance, if a StringBuilder is
temporarily stored in a variable).
In addition to the sources of false negatives listed above,
Stringoid can also produce false positives. The main reason
is the path-insensitive nature of the analysis; for instance, if a
method contains two if-branches with the same condition,
Stringoid will consider four possible executions, while in
reality only two are possible (both conditions are true or both
are false).
Despite these limitations, we have found Stringoid in prac-
tice to be able to produce large sets of URL patterns and,
through sampling, have not observed instances of obvious false
positives.
C. Data collection methods
Using Stringoid, we are able to apply the analysis of web
requests to a large number of applications. One source for
these applications is the Playdrone dataset [6]. Playdrone is a
distributed mining effort to collect binaries as well as meta data
for over a million of Android applications from the Google
Play store.
For our analysis, we made use of the most recent snapshot
of the dataset (from October 2014), which is made publicly
available on the Internet Archive.3 From that dataset we
selected the 30, 000 most popular applications, based on the
number of downloads made available as part of application
meta data, for which the application binary (.apk file) is
also publicly available (this excludes paid applications). The
raw data of these 30, 000 APK files plus metadata totaled in
approximately 330 GB.
To extract URLs from this input data, and get a sense of
the capabilities of Stringoid at scale, we performed two ex-
periments: First, we ran a simple constant extraction analysis:
it looks for constant strings in the disassembled source code
that look like URLs, i.e. that start with the (case-insensitive)
prefix http:// or https://. We implemented this analysis
as part of Stringoid for convenience, although similar results
can be obtained with the Android disassembler (dexdump) and
grep. An added benefit of implementing the analysis on top
of the same toolchain as Stringoid is that it lets us estimate the
overhead of the full analysis (see below). Second, we used the
full automaton-building analysis of Stringoid to extract URL
patterns.
D. Static request data
We ran both experiments on all 30, 000 applications using
Apache Spark4 on a cluster of four 8-core machines. The
total CPU time spent in the analyses was 99.5 and 122.2
hours for the constants and Stringoid analyses respectively.
This lets us estimate the average overhead of Stringoid as
22.8%, or 2.8 seconds per application on average. For 945
applications (3.2%), at least one analysis failed to produce
a result, due to errors beyond our control in the Android
bytecode processing library which Stringoid relies on. When-
ever one analysis failed to produce a result, we excluded the
results for both. (In the following we still refer to 30, 000
applications for presentation clarity.) All produced datasets are
publicly available [7]. Table II shows the size of the sets of
3https://archive.org/details/android apps
4http://spark.apache.org/
Domains Path-pairs Key-triples Value-tuples
Constants 47, 920 142, 791 35, 440 55, 211
Stringoid 50, 483 207, 047 83, 014 170, 981
Improvement +5.3% +45.0% +134.2% +209.7%
TABLE II: Comparison of Stringoid with constant string
extraction on 30, 000 applications.
URL components extracted by each analysis on the 30, 000
applications, expressed using the methodology outlined in
Section II-B. Note that by definition, the results produced
by Stringoid are strict supersets of those produced by the
constants analysis, because each constant string will at least
be represented by an automaton with a single transition, even
if it is never concatenated to anything else.
We can see from the results that the improvements get
higher as we move to elements more “to the right” of URLs.
This is explained by the fact that in practice URLs are con-
structed left-to-right. The more concatenations Stringoid can
detect, the deeper the information about the URL. Recovering
such a wealth of information for a large set of applications also
lets us compute some statistics that can reveal trends in mobile
applications, and detect cases of complex URL creations in the
applications.
1) Macro-perspective on web requests: Analyzing request
data from large amounts of applications allows to derive
insights into the usage of external services.
One question we can attempt to answer with the data
computed by Stringoid is the variety of Internet resources
accessed by applications. Figure 5 shows a histogram of
the number of unique domains per application. While the
average number of unique URLs found per application is
19.9, roughly 62.5% of applications are found to contain
URLs with that many or fewer unique domains. For half
the applications, 14 or fewer domains were found. On the
other hand, a comparatively small fraction of applications
include considerably more unique domains in their URLs,
for example, only 22 applications reveal URLs with 150 or
more different domains. The highest number of domains per
application is an outlier with value 4, 206 (not displayed on
the graph for readability, the second highest has 534 unique
domains); it is the application “World Newspapers” which
advertises itself as a media directory and which contains
links to thousands of news organizations around the world.
Another notable anomaly, although barely visible in Figure 5,
are 5 applications in which we find URLs with the same 308
domains each. These are related translation applications by the
same publisher, which share a common code base.
A related question is the relative importance of Internet
resources; with the data from Stringoid, we can phrase it as
computing the distributions of the number of applications that
use a domain, which is the dual to the previous question.
Figure 6 illustrates this distribution. On average 10.6 applica-
tions denote URLs for a given domain, and 38, 466 (or 76.2%)
of these domains are found in URLs of a single application
only. The relatively high mean and standard deviation of
Fig. 5: Histogram of unique domains per application. Note
that the x-axis is log-scaled.
Fig. 6: Histogram of application usage per domain. Note that
both axes are log-scaled.
221.6 are explained by a comparatively small fraction of
domains that are invoked by many applications. These findings
point to a power-law distribution of the usage of domains
by mobile applications. We expect this to come at least in
part from the standard pattern of exposing a private service to
one or a select few dedicated applications. This hypothesis
is additionally supported by the subset of domains which
represent hard-coded IP addresses, which we can assume are
used by developers who have control over the servers. Overall,
we found 1, 703 such IP address across all applications, 1, 314
of which were only found in a single application.
At the other end of the power distribution, our results
highlight the importance of a few selected resources. Table III
shows the 10 most commonly used domains across all 30, 000
applications. Notably but perhaps not surprisingly on the
Android platform, all of them relate to Google offerings
(AdMob is also a Google company).
2) Selected results: Beyond aggregate data, the URLs pro-
duced by Stringoid further provide means to detect interesting
patterns on an application level. For example, Figure 7 shows
one of the longest patterns computed by Stringoid, from a
dating application.
The pattern corresponds to an HTTP GET request that we
concluded the application makes at the end of the registration
phase. It is a perfect example of a very long request where
all keys are present in the application and thus exposed by
Stringoid, and all values will be filled in at runtime. What
http://example.com/registration/registrationfbapp2.php?Name=[]&DobDay=[]&DobMonth=[]&DobYear=[]&Gender=[]&Age=[]&MaritalStat 
us=[]&NoOfChildren=[]&Language=[]&ChildrenLivingStatus=[]&Religion=[]&Caste=[]&CasteOthers=[]&CasteNoBar=[]&SubCaste=[]&Go 
thra=[]&gothramid=[]&MotherTongue=[]&Citizenship=[]&CountrySelected=[]&ResidentStatus=[]&OccupationCategory=[]&ByWhom=[]&
Password=[]&Email=[]&CountryCode=[]&MobileNo=[]&FamilyValue=[]&FamilyType=[]&FamilyStatus=[]&ANCESTRALSTATE=[]&ANCES 
TRALORIGIN=[]&FEET=[]&CMS=[]&WeightKgs=[]&WeightLbs=[]&BodyType=[]&Complexion=[]&PhysicalStatus=[]&EDUCATION=[]&OT 
HEREDUCATION=[]&othereducationindetavail=[]&ADDITIONALEDUCATION=[]&OCCUPATION=[]&OCCUPATIONCATEGORY=[]&inc 
ome[]inr=[]&INCOMETYPE=[]&IncomeCurrency=[]&AnnualIncome=[]&EatingHabits=[]&DrinkingHabits=[]&SmokingHabits=[]&SUDDHAJ 
ADHAGAMON=[]&Manglik=[]&Star=[]&Raasi=[]&SubCasteId=[]&RESIDINGSTATE[]TXT=[]&residingstateval=[]&residingcityval=[]&desc 
det=[]&rregid=[]&residingareaval=[]&residingdistrictval=[]&ResidingCityId=[]&IpAddress=[]&Status=[]&PhoneCountryCode=[]&Area
Code =[]&PhoneNo=[]&prdomain=[]&randno=[]&campaign=[]&campaign=&OUTPUTTYPE=[]&APPTYPE=[]&APPVERSION=[] 
Fig. 7: One of the longest patterns computed by Stringoid, exposing a lack of security in a dating application transmitting
sensitive private information – highlights are marked. The original domain name was redacted.
No Domain Number of apps.
1 media.admob.com 16,725
2 plus.google.com 13,158
3 www.google.com 12,776
4 googleads.g.doubleclick.net 11,602
5 www.googleapis.com 11,105
6 www.google-analytics.com 10,693
7 ssl.google-analytics.com 10,671
8 play.google.com 9,986
9 www.googletagmanager.com 9,139
10 market.android.com 7,818
TABLE III: Top 10 domains used across most applications. We
removed schemas.android.com, hostname, and details
from this list as these domains do not translate to actual HTTP
requests.
is staggering is the amount of personal and highly sensitive
information that is encoded in the request (salary, religious
beliefs, etc.). While a user of a dating application will certainly
realize that this information will be communicated to the
server (since he or she needs to provide it), Stringoid exposes
that it is most likely sent over the network without any
encryption.
Applications can expose users’ secrets through URLs, but
they occasionally also expose the secrets of their developers.
One URL pattern retrieved by Stringoid has the following
structure (some keys and values are omitted for simplicity):
https://ex.com/search?q=[ ]...&clientsecret=OSJ...
...where the secret key is a long private chain of characters.
In this example, in reconstructing fragments of the URL,
Stringoid assembled various program variables and was able
to replace the secret key. Note that the secret appears after
a placeholder, meaning that the simpler constant extraction
would not be enough to correctly place it in the URL. Looking
through the complete set of results, we found 2, 420 unique
instances of key-value pairs where the key contained either the
word “secret” or “key”. We expect that a researcher targeting
access credentials for specific services would have no trouble
recovering many from Stringoid results.
E. Discussion and takeaways
We have demonstrated that our dedicated static analysis
designed for extracting URL patterns outperforms simple
constant extraction, and is applicable at scale. The results are
quantitatively better, extracting more of each type of URL
component, and particularly elements such as query parameter
keys and values.
Because URL patterns are longer and richer, the results are
also qualitatively better, unlocking the potential for detect-
ing e.g. complex web API invocations. Our cursory macro
analyses show that popular services can be identified from
looking at sufficiently many applications. We expect that the
publication of our datasets will enable further analyses at scale,
such as security leak detections.
V. COMPARING AND CONTRASTING ANALYSES
We have looked at analyzing web requests from mobile
applications using either dynamic or static techniques. A
subsequent question is: how do the results compare to another?
And where do they individually shine?
Table IV compares URLs, broken down into different com-
ponents “domains”, “path pairs”, “key triples”, and “value
tuples” (as defined in Section II) that we either observed solely
in the dynamic analysis, solely in the static analysis using
Stringoid, or in the dynamic and in the static analysis. In
the first columns, we see that already a significant amount of
domains appears only either in the static or dynamic data. This
tendency increases when looking at the path pairs, key triples,
and value tuples respectively. In the remainder of this section,
we attempt to explain and illustrate these observations.
A. URLs found only in dynamic data
One explanation for URL components only present in
dynamic data is that they are never to be found in the
statically analyzed code to begin with. Table V presents the
overall and unique counts of URLs we collected for each
application in the 5 minute experiments. However, many of
the URLs of observed requests do not originate from the
application code. On the one hand, URLs may stem from
application resources other than the application code, (for
instance, in a separate .xml file). Furthermore, URLs may
stem from the content received from previous requests. As
a simple illustration, consider the very common pattern of
displaying an advertisement in an application: the application
first makes a request to an advertisement broker, the broker
returns the relevant information, including the URL of an
image to display. The device then makes a request to obtain
that image and finally display it. In the example described
above, the first requested URL (the broker) originates from
the application code, but the second one (the image) originates
Application Domains Path pairs Key triples Value tuples
| D | | D ∩ S | | S | | D | | D ∩ S | | S | | D | | D ∩ S | | S | | D | | D ∩ S | | S |
Lep’s World 3 5 18 13 3 39 80 0 25 107 0 25
Xperia Z 13 3 8 20 2 19 86 1 24 124 1 95
MP3 Cutter and Ringtone ... 3 2 3 16 2 5 84 0 1 288 0 1
Paper Toss 99 3 17 195 3 22 566 0 44 1,013 0 50
Fotor 8 7 13 59 3 37 54 0 19 245 0 19
HangMan Game 15 2 5 69 1 12 55 0 1 58 0 2
GO Weather EX 8 7 43 15 7 76 87 9 44 97 4 64
Pocket 20 4 20 59 10 89 91 0 35 106 0 41
Where is that? 22 4 55 54 1 72 320 0 48 434 0 49
Bubble Blast 5 2 42 20 0 69 60 0 85 235 0 106
Quick PDF Scanner 5 5 10 64 4 14 118 0 4 259 0 5
Nearby Messenger 2 4 34 7 6 41 50 0 27 79 0 27
Tapatalk 17 11 56 93 19 156 144 3 24 179 0 29
Rage Meme Camera 5 4 6 29 0 12 81 0 23 181 0 23
Retrica 2 2 18 12 2 57 28 0 2 29 0 3
Logo Quiz Ultimate 6 7 71 22 6 964 210 0 41 395 0 59
BeyondPod 22 3 25 31 0 52 41 0 14 45 0 15
Broken Screen 5 5 14 27 3 25 118 0 1 157 0 1
iFunny 16 5 56 76 0 80 417 0 38 489 0 39
Wisielec: Kto zostanie ... 8 0 1 32 0 1 41 0 0 70 0 0
Total 284 85 515 913 72 1,842 2,731 13 500 4,590 5 653
TABLE IV: Comparison of found URL components (cf. Section II-B). | D | = found uniquely in dynamic analysis; | D ∩ S |
= found in dynamic and static analysis; | S | = found uniquely in static analysis.
URLs observed
dynamically
URLs matched outside
of code
Application Name overall unique in static
resources
in
responses
Lep’s World 85 22 - 14
Xperia Z 86 28 1 26
MP3 Cutter... 156 63 - 63
Paper Toss 1,059 324 - 323
Fotor 324 124 - 44
HangMan Game 224 73 - 72
GO Weather EX 193 27 - 16
Pocket 299 86 - 75
Where is that? 320 92 - 85
Bubble Blast 171 54 - 53
Quick PDF Scanner 326 118 - 87
Nearby Messenger 147 18 - 11
Tapatalk 834 145 - 111
Rage Meme Cam... 303 73 - 48
Retrica 91 15 - 11
Logo Quiz Ultimate 207 59 - 41
BeyondPod 183 33 13 18
Broken Screen 335 44 - 24
iFunny 551 114 - 83
Wisielec: Kto... 81 37 - 36
Total 5,975 1,549 14 1,241
TABLE V: Classification of monitored application requests
and comparison with static analysis results.
from the response received to the first request. Even a perfect
static analysis has no way of recovering the information from
the second URL, as it is external to the application. Finally,
URLs may depend on specific user actions or input. Such
information is likely to be used, for example, as values in query
strings, which helps explain the significantly higher number of
observed value tuples in the dynamic data.
The columns “URLs matched outside code” in Table V
indicate how many (unique) URLs were matched to static
resources in the application packages and the contents of
responses to other requests. To compute these sets, we first ran
an automatic string matcher. It identified all URLs in resources
and 417 URLs in request responses. Exact matching is not suf-
ficiently precise, however; many responses contain for instance
HTML or JavaScript content, which itself includes relative
links or dynamically constructs URL fragments. We further
manually inspected all remaining URLs with a custom-built
tool highlighting which fragments were found in responses.
When in doubt, we checked the contents of the responses to
establish a probable cause if possible. We erred on the side
of classifying a URL as originating from the application code.
Using this labor-intensive procedure, we manually classified
825 URLs as originating from responses and 294 as originating
from application code.
This effort shows that in practice, a very large fraction of
dynamically observed requests can potentially be explained
by factors independent of the application code. To consider
an extreme case, in the application “Paper Toss”, out of 324
unique request URLs, 323 were found in responses.
B. URLs found only in static data
On the other hand, we observe that a significant fraction of
URLs is only detected by the static analysis.
One reason for this observation is that the dynamic anal-
ysis may simply fail to produce desired results. As dis-
cussed in Section III-C, one challenge of the dynamic
analysis is how to ensure coverage of an application. In
some cases, thus, the static analysis produces valid URLs,
for which, however, we fail to trigger the correspond-
ing request when executing the application in our experi-
ments. As a concrete example, in the application Pocket,
Stringoid identified URLs which we could manually at-
tribute to 28 API endpoints for the domain getpocket.com,
and which we were not able to trigger by exer-
cising the application (getpocket.com/v3/acctchange,
getpocket.com/v3/listinfoupdate, etc.). These URLs
not only seem valid, but also support a motivated use case to
learn about services or APIs from analyzing web requests.
Another source of URLs reported only in the static
analysis is dead code in applications: developers often include
libraries which provide functionality beyond what is required
in the application. For instance, a library for facilitating
authentication may contain URLs pointing to multiple
providers even if the application is configured to use only
one. Because Stringoid analyzes all methods regardless of
reachability from application entry points, it will report URLs
for all providers. In consequence, the static analysis finds
URLs including https://api.twitter.com/oauth,
https://m.facebook.com/login.php, and
https://www.googleapis.com/auth across various
applications.
Finally, like all practical static analyses, Stringoid is not
fully precise and may overapproximate the set of concate-
nations that can be produced in valid executions. While this
is somewhat mitigated by the fact that we only keep URL
(patterns) that can be processed with Python urllib, there
are no formal guarantees on the precision of the result set, as
discussed in Section IV-B.
VI. RELATED WORK
Related work has addressed the problem of understand-
ing the network activities of mobile applications through
dynamic analyses. A set of works assesses mobile appli-
cation network traffic for security and privacy reasons. For
example, it attempts to detect malware that infects Android
applications based on observing applications’ network traffic
patterns, relying on features like request sizes, frequencies,
and IP addresses [13]. Or, a tool called Securacy, installed on
mobile devices, monitors IP addresses and ports invoked from
the device, and checks whether secure connections (HTTPS)
are used to identify potential security violations [14]. Other
works attempt to associate monitored requests with the mobile
applications from which they originate, relying for example on
HTTP headers [10] or on previously learned network patterns
of in-app advertisement services used by applications [11].
All of these works are either limited to un-encrypted traffic,
or rely on information that can be collected in any case, like
IP addresses. In contrast, in our dynamic analysis, we used
a proxy server with a man-in-the-middle facility to obtain
information about the URLs being invoked even when traffic
is encrypted.
On the static analysis aspect, beyond extracting web re-
quests specifically, a wealth of work exists for analyzing the
strings that can appear in an application – similar to what
Stringoid does. Automata have been used before to represent
strings [15]; a key issue in general-purpose string analysis is
whether widening is used to make the analysis more tractable
as in [16]. In Stringoid we have side-stepped the issue of loops
by focusing on straight-line constructions, which we believe
cover the majority of URLs. Other abstract representations
for string values have been tried; the HAMPI [17] solver for
instance builds a customized efficient representation, which
can be used to efficiently check the presence of certain
substrings, but it requires a finite bound on strings. Because
we are focused on enumerating possible strings rather than
checking them against a candidate language as is common in
security applications, and because we did not want to a priori
impose length constraints, we favored automata.
Static analyses are typically evaluated with respect to a
known ground truth. Our work in contrast compares the results
of Stringoid to data obtained dynamically, providing a unique
perspective on the strengths and limitations of both approaches
in a concrete use case.
Android applications have been mined, among other things,
for security credentials [6], for automatically generating graph-
ical user-interface test cases [18], to understand how power
consumption of mobile devices is managed [19], or to detect
malware [20] or data leaks [21]. However, to the best of our
knowledge, Android applications have not yet been mined at
scale to detect web requests.
Beyond the here used Playdrone dataset of Android appli-
cations [6], other datasets have been published, that provide
source code version histories of selected Android applica-
tions [22], or follow a continuous mining strategy to reflect
the ever-growing Android ecosystem [23]. We chose Playdrone
when starting our work as the only dataset that made available
the desired amount of application binaries.
VII. CONCLUSION
We explored the potential for analyzing web requests made
by Android applications in two ways; our dynamic analy-
sis, through instrumentation, reveals common communication
patterns. Thanks to the use of an HTTPS proxy, we were
able to produce a dataset of complete sets of requests and
responses for 20 applications exercised manually. Furthermore,
we manually classified all requests according to the likely
origin of their URL. Ultimately, we demonstrated that a
large number of web requests made by applications are not
immediately traceable to their code.
In contrast, static analysis, our second approach, while
carefully designed, is a blunt tool; our analysis can extract
large amounts of URL components from a large number of
application with no supervision, making it amenable to large-
scale studies. We have hinted at some of the possibilities
opened up by our dataset and our tool Stringoid. On appli-
cations for which we could compare both approaches, we
discovered, through the results of static analysis, URL and
URL components which we were not able to exercise dynam-
ically despite our best efforts. While we cannot conclusively
establish that these are valid and live in the application, it
demonstrates the potential of static analysis tools such as
Stringoid to assist in coverage, and to map out APIs from
unknown applications.
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